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Viewing the Operation Iraqi Freedom case study through Maslow's lens, the following questions will be proposed. First, what is Iraq's history? This first question is necessary to put into context the condition of Iraq when U.S. forces invaded. Second, were Iraqis' physiological needs being met? Third, what did Iraqis view as most important in the years immediately following the invasion? Did they want democracy or sovereignty before security, employment, or health care? Fourth, were Iraqis' safety needs met? Fifth, what challenges did the U.S. face while establishing a government in Iraq? This question is tied to Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a way to examine key decisions made by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) and the impacts those decisions had on the Iraqi people. Finally, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines is provided as a successful example of the application of Maslow's principles.

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TITLE: THERE ARE NO NEW LESSONS LEARNED, JUST OLD LESSONS RELEARNED: A CASE STUDY OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM THROUGH MASLOW'S LENS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Preface

From April 2006 to April 2007 I deployed with the HQ 414 Civil Affairs Battalion to Baghdad, Iraq, a unique opportunity for a naval officer. My year in Baghdad left me with some distinct impressions. First, I saw the importance of civil military operations, especially after kinetic operations or insurgent attacks. Second, I was left with the impression that we were expending a lot of effort trying to make a national government work when those endeavors could have otherwise been focused on essential services, training Iraqi Security Forces, and establishing local governments. Finally, I returned with the impression that the key to suppressing an insurgency is that the leadership (U.S. or host nation) needs to meet the basic needs of the people, including food, security, and jobs. Otherwise, a power vacuum will develop that allows insurgents to meet the needs of the people and build their own support base.

These impressions and my subsequent research led me to think about the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency and reconstruction. Reflection on my basic psychology classes reminded me of Maslow's hierarchy of needs and led me to see how it mirrored the issues in Iraq. As a result my thesis was born: *Maslow's hierarchy of needs provides a useful lens through which to view the problem of nation building and counterinsurgency.* I understand that one of the basic tenets of counterinsurgency is the ability of the indigenous government to self-govern and gain the confidence of the indigenous people. However, I believe that decades of dictatorship and the ethnic and sectarian divide in Iraq made this a much more complicated problem that could not be solved by installing a new democratic government. In my opinion, a phased plan that first focused on essential services and security, then local governance, followed by regional governance, and finally national governance could have prevented an insurgency and stabilized Iraq much more quickly. While Iraq is unique and direct correlations cannot be drawn to every

other counterinsurgency operation, I believe that there are enduring lessons from Iraq that will help in future counterinsurgency operations and prevent an insurgency from developing during future reconstruction efforts. This paper will not be a critique of the decision to invade Iraq or assign blame. Further, it will not be an analysis of the civil military operations in Iraq. This research paper is focused on the applicability of Maslow's hierarchy of needs in planning for counterinsurgency and reconstruction operations.

I would like to acknowledge several key people who supported me throughout this project. The staff of the Gray Research Center was very helpful and patient, thank you. Dr. Donald Bittner, Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber, and Dr. Doug Streusand provided essential guidance throughout this project and were key enablers to my success, thank you. My wife, Elizabeth, gave me unconditional love, support, and encouragement that made this project much easier. Thank you and I love you very much. Finally, thanks and praise goes to my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. Through Him all things are possible.

Executive Summary

Title: There Are No New Lessons Learned, Just Old Lessons Relearned: A Case Study of Operation Iraqi Freedom Through the Eyes of Maslow.

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Thesis: Maslow's hierarchy of needs provides a useful lens through which to view the problem of reconstruction and counterinsurgency.

Discussion: Viewing the Operation Iraqi Freedom case study through Maslow's lens, the following questions will be proposed. First, what is Iraq's history? This first question is necessary to put into context the condition of Iraq when U.S. forces invaded. Second, were Iraqis' physiological needs being met? Third, what did Iraqis view as most important in the years immediately following the invasion? Did they want democracy or sovereignty before security, employment, or health care? Fourth, were Iraqis' safety needs met? Fifth, what challenges did the U.S. face while establishing a government in Iraq? This question is tied to Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a way to examine key decisions made by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) and the impacts those decisions had on the Iraqi people. Finally, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines is provided as a successful example of the application of Maslow's principles.

Conclusion: This review of OIF and the Huk Rebellion has provided five enduring lessons that can be carried forward to future counterinsurgency and reconstruction operations. First, military planners must know the history of the country in order to effectively plan for reconstruction or counterinsurgency operations. Second, it is critical to understand the population's needs. Third, military planners need to take into consideration the second and third order effects of their decisions. Fourth, establishing local governance is more beneficial both for addressing the needs of the people and as a starting point towards establish national governance. Finally, Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is a useful lens through which to view the problem of reconstruction and counterinsurgency.

A common expression among military officers is "There are no new lessons learned, just old lessons relearned." This expression is fitting for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), since the United States had to relearn old lessons. The Counterinsurgency Manuel (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5) and the Small Wars Manual (FMFRP 12-15) capture many of these old lessons learned. Both of these manuals are essential references for the commander on the ground; however, the success of the commander on the ground depends on the operational planning conducted by the Combatant Commander's (COCOM) staff and subordinate headquarters. Further, effective planning in every echelon of the chain command depends on proper definition of the problem.

In order to define a problem appropriately, it is important to first choose the lens through which to view it. The lens used to define the problem will help the planner frame the issues in the planning process. One useful lens through which to view reconstruction and counterinsurgency (COIN) is Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Abraham Maslow, a renowned American psychologist, prioritized human needs into four categories and his theory suggests that humans are motivated by their desire meet these needs. In order of precedence, the needs are physiology, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization.[1] His theory also suggests that a human is more motivated to meet the basic needs before pursuing higher order needs (see the diagram in Appendix A). This paper will make the case that Maslow's hierarchy of needs provides a useful lens through which to view the problem of reconstruction and COIN.

Using OIF and the Huk Rebellion as case studies; the enduring lessons will be extracted for the planning of future operations. The importance of these enduring lessons is to provide the planner with a framework in which to work. It is not the intention of this paper to give the planner a prepackaged plan or checklist to apply to the next Iraq or Afghanistan.

Viewing the OIF case study through Maslow's lens, the following questions will be proposed. First, what is the history of Iraq? This first question is necessary to put into context the condition of Iraq when U.S. forces invaded. Second, were Iraqis' physiological needs being met? Third, what did Iraqis view as most important in the years immediately following the invasion? Did they want democracy or sovereignty before security, employment, or health care? Fourth, were Iraqis' safety needs met? Fifth, what challenges did the U.S. face while establishing a government in Iraq? This question is tied to Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a way to examine key decisions made by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) and the impacts those decisions had on the Iraqi people. Finally, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines is provided as a successful example of the application of Maslow's principles.

Numerous books and articles document the successes and failures of OIF,[2] therefore reflection on OIF needs to move away from assigning blame and move towards capturing the enduring lessons that can be carried forward. The intent of this research is not to add to the litany of literature lauding the successes or failures of OIF. Rather, the goal is to provide future planners at the Combatant Command and subordinate headquarters with an additional perspective in which to frame complex problems in the future.

WHAT IS IRAQ'S HISTORY?

Before conducting reconstruction or COIN operations in any given country, it is important to understand the historical context of the country. As Americans, we take for granted our understanding and faith in democracy. We have centuries of experience to tell us that we can obtain our basic needs in a democratic society. Perhaps democracy works in the U.S. because

the majority of the population's physiological and safety needs have been met. Planners cannot assume that the same level of familiarity or comfort with democracy will exist in failed nations. Iraq's history is examined with these thoughts in mind.

Democracy in Iraq can be traced back to before the World War I victors drew the artificial lines in the sand to form the country of Iraq. While under Ottoman rule, the Young Turk revolution of 1908 brought the first glimmers of democracy as Iraqis voted for the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in their first election. However, the Committee for Union and Progress, the same political party that pushed so valiantly for the liberalization of the Ottoman Government, soon turned authoritarian as they pushed their Turkish language and culture on the Arabic people of Iraq.[3] Though short lived, these early Iraqis had their first taste of democracy.

World War I brought an end to the Ottoman Empire and brought the British into Iraq with promises of liberty and freedom from Ottoman autocratic rule. With the establishment of Iraq, Great Britain inherited a new country that was not industrialized, had a 95% illiteracy rate, and lacked an established middle class. Further, the boundaries the British established to form Iraq did not take into consideration the ethnic or religious differences that would later result in constant tensions between Sunni Arabs, Shi'ite Muslims, and the Kurds.[4]

British reluctance to give sovereignty to Iraq resulted in the Great Uprising of 1920, in which the Iraqi political parties and societies demanded a sovereign Iraq ruled by a constitutional monarchy. Several cities, such as Najaf and Karbala, even established self-governance after expelling the British. Some of the cities became so efficient that the British left those government structures in place after the uprising was quelled. Following the uprising, the British established a monarchy under King Faysal, who had previously been the King of Greater Syria. After much protest from the Iraqi educated class and support from religious clerics, the British

relented and Iraq formed a constitution and a parliament. The Iraqi government struggled because some of the politicians lacked an understanding of parliamentary procedures and were barely literate tribal leaders. Despite these challenges, the new government still produced and ratified the Basic Law, which was similar to the British system and provided for the basic rights of Iraqis, such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Most importantly, it provided a forum to voice dissatisfaction.[5]

The rule of King Faysal also gave birth to the first political parties in 1922, *Hizb al-Watani al-'Iraqi* and *Hizb al-Nahdha al-'Iraqiya.* While these first political parties were a weak variant of their western counterparts, they were essential to creating a political environment that allowed for debate over important policies of the state. The majority of the political parties lost their cause and faded away by the mid-thirties after the most contentious issues within Iraq were resolved like acceptance into the UN and signing of a 25-year treaty with Great Britain.[6]

King Faysal's principal challenge was to close the ethno-sectarian gaps that riddled the new state of Iraq. Adeed Dawisha wrote, "The state that the British assembled in 1921 had major fissures between Arab and Kurd, Sunni and Shi'ite. These fault lines overlapped with, and indeed were cemented by, the cultural and economic disparities that existed between the urban and rural areas."[7] In order for Iraq to be a nation, Iraqis would have to put nationalism before notions of ethnicity and religion. This idea of nationalism would be a priority for Faysal's Director General of Education, Sati' al-Husri; unfortunately educating all Iraqis was not his priority. The education policy he put in place ensured the spread of nationalism and resulted in "urban Sunni predominance in the political and cultural spheres."[8] As a result, the majority of mid-grade and senior army officers were Sunnis. It was not until 1933, when a Shi'ite Director General of Education was put in place that education was spread to Shi'a areas.[9]

The Bakr Sidqi military coup in 1936 ushered in a period of turbulence in Iraq and a steady move towards authoritarian rule. All 458 political parties were disbanded and 130 newspapers and magazines had their licenses revoked, though only 29 were in distribution. This ratcheting down on civil liberties paved the way for the July 14 coup. The military coup of July 14, 1958 brought an end to monarchial rule and began the authoritarian republic under the rule of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim. The 1963 military coup by the Ba'ath Party brought an end to the strictly military rule of Qasim and introduced many civilians into key ministry positions, which helped them gain the populations support. The Ba'ath Party also brought the end to any remnants of democratic hope.[10]

The short-lived democratic government of King Faysal left room for improvement, however it was a functioning democracy. Unfortunately, the series of military coups beginning in 1936 and the authoritarian rule of Saddam Hussein brought an end to the democratic experience in Iraq. Worthy of note, the average lifespan of an Iraqi in 2002 was sixty-three years.[11] Thus, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of Iraqis at the time of the invasion were not alive while Iraq was ruled democratically or did not have a memory of democracy. As a result, Iraq's democratic experience did not leave a lasting impression. Based on this examination of Iraq's history, the U.S. government and the CPA overvalued the assumption that Iraqis would immediately embrace democracy when they were still struggling to meet their basic needs.

WERE IRAQIS' PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS BEING MET?

It is important to understand the state of Iraq's disrepair in order to put into context the challenges that the U.S. faced in Iraq. Once the gem of the Middle East, the costly Iran-Iraq War

and a decade of sanctions left the Iraqi government severely in debt and struggling to maintain its regime. Symptoms of Iraq's crippled system were the lack of quality health care, poor education, and failing infrastructure. Though the Sunni dominated areas received enough funding to function, the country as a whole declined throughout the 1990s.[12]

The Ba'ath regime's polices after Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait created a humanitarian crisis. The regime lost control of the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq and suppressed the Shi'a revolt of 1991. To punish the Shi'ites the Ba'ath regime under-funded development projects and essential services in southern Iraq, resulting in a severely reduced standard of living.[13] Saddam Hussein also ordered the draining of the marshlands resulting in an environmental catastrophe and a loss of an essential food source for many Iraqis.[14] The campaign against the Marsh Arabs resulted in 300,000 internally displaced persons, whose livelihood depended on the marshlands. This displacement was in addition to approximately 500,000 displaced Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians, who were driven out of their homes for reasons of security and "Arabization."[15] This problem became worse as sectarian divides led to the removal of many more Sunni and Shi'a from their homes during the occupation.

The dire state of Iraq's economy began to show in the 1990s as a result of sanctions, the trade embargo, and poor governmental spending.[16] By the time Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's gross national product had declined by 80% in a decade.[17] Unemployment in the national workforce was 30% to 50%, while in the Shi'a slums of Baghdad it was 60%. Iraqi families were dependent on monthly subsides of foodstuffs and commodities to survive, much of which was provided by the international aid community.[18]

The small middle class population lost considerable wealth and income throughout the 1990s. The epitome of the Iraqi middle class, the schoolteacher, was only making five dollars a

month. These conditions led to an enormous loss of talent as educated and skilled professionals emigrated to other countries. Those who remained turned toward corruption to supplement their income. Professionals providing free governmental services, such as health care, began charging fees in order to provide supposedly free services, which only added to the already declining health care system.[19]

Prior to 1990, the World Health Organization rated Iraq as having one of the best health care systems in the Middle East.[20] However, Saddam Hussein reduced health care spending by 90% through the 1990s, redirecting those funds towards financing the army and building palaces. Doctors' salaries decreased to $20 per month and medical facilities were not maintained. In keeping with Ba'ath party practices, better health care services favored areas that were supportive of the Ba'ath regime. The increase in the maternal mortality rate by three times was indicative of the decline in the health care system.[21]

The dismal state of Iraq's sanitation system contributed significantly to the poor health conditions. Garbage was piling up in Baghdad's streets and 40% of its wastewater was being pumped into the Tigris River untreated.[22] These poor sanitary conditions resulted in the child mortality rate doubling in southern Iraq.[23] The U.S. Agency for International Development reported that hundreds of thousands of children died in the last 12 years of Saddam Hussein's reign as a result.[24]

In addition to the lack of repair parts, treatment chemicals, and neglect, insufficient electricity severely restricted the operation of sewage treatment facilities. The electrical power plants were so poorly maintained prior to the invasion that, with the exception of Baghdad, the majority of the country only received a few hours of power per day.[25] Despite U.S. efforts not to target power plants, bombing attacks still damaged the associated fuel lines and electrical

transmission lines. To make the situation worse, looters stole the computerized control systems from the power plant in Baghdad and transmission lines were stripped of copper and aluminum. The severely degraded electrical infrastructure caused dire second order effects, such as limiting U.S. officials' ability to communicate with the Iraqi people, a more tenuous security situation, and additional stress as the oppressive summer heat approached.[26]

Looting had a detrimental effect on Baghdad's already weak infrastructure. Sparing nothing, the looters stole barbwire, electrical wiring, chain link fences, and in some instances bricks from buildings.[27] The ministries that U.S. officials intended to utilize were severely degraded, along with two of the three sewage treatment facilities in Baghdad. Even police stations were not sacred to looters, who took advantage of the police officers' absence from duty.[28]

As previously mentioned, teachers were under-paid by any standard, which negatively affected the Iraqi education system. Much like Iraq's infrastructure and health care, Iraq's education system was one of the best in the Middle East in the 1980s. However, at the time of the invasion schools lacked basic supplies and textbooks, and teachers lacked sufficient training.[29] A quarter of school age children were working instead of attending school to help supplement family incomes in Iraq's failing economy.[30] Further, teachers were forced to push the Ba'ath agenda in the classroom or be dismissed from their job.[31] This poor education system was not conducive to creating a pool of young adults capable of taking on the challenges necessary to rebuild Iraq.

Saddam Hussein's regime destroyed the essential services designed to meet the Iraqis' physiological needs as described by of Maslow. Through malnutrition, poor health care, and poor sanitary conditions he deprived them of their most basic physiological needs. His police

forces did not provide for the Iraqis' safety needs, but were instead corrupt and responsible for the mass murders of approximately 290,000 Kurds and Shi'a, which were found in numerous mass gravesites.[32] The high unemployment rates and reduced wages for professionals affected both safety and esteem needs, while the high mortality rates affected Iraqi families and their love needs.

Meeting the physiological and safety needs allows a person to have a sense of morality, removes prejudices, and gives rise to thoughts of governance.[33] However, the majority of Iraqis did not have their basic needs met leading into OIF. This could explain the mass looting after the removal of Saddam Hussein and the sectarian strife (driven by prejudices) that ensued as people were trying to fulfill their own basic needs. As a result, Iraqis put their allegiance with those who could provide for their basic needs. Had the U.S. made this its first priority, then the power vacuum that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein might have been prevented and sectarian strife may have been minimized.

WHAT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO IRAQIS?

With an understanding of the state of Iraq leading into the invasion, it is now important to look at the desires of the newly liberated Iraqis. The following polling data from 2003 and 2004 will demonstrate that Iraqi desires did reflect Maslow's hierarchy of needs and the dire state of Iraq. A poll conducted for the CPA in November and December of 2003 found that 62% of 1,167 Iraqis polled stated security was their biggest concern.[34]

Another poll conducted in May 2004 by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS) also indicated the Iraqis' desires. It showed that 59% of Iraqis

polled saw security as the most urgent issue for Iraq and that 49% of all respondents did not feel safe in their own neighborhoods. Sixteen percent of respondents said the most concerning issue for them was the economy, while 15% of respondents said the most concerning issue for them within a year of the invasion was infrastructure.[35] Per Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the physiological needs that could be addressed through improving the economy and repairing infrastructure (such as sanitation systems) should have been the primary concern for Iraqis over security. However, Maslow's hierarchy of needs does not account for the necessity of security to facilitate improvement in essential services and the economy.

According to the May 2004 IIACSS opinion poll, 90% of Iraqis polled viewed security, economy and infrastructure as the most urgent issues facing Iraq. The remaining 10% of the Iraqis polled viewed "other" as the most urgent issue facing Iraq. Somewhere in that 10% lies governance or sovereignty as the most urgent issue facing Iraq. The same poll asked, "If you could vote for any living Iraqi president, who would it be?" Fifty-four percent responded either "none" or "I do not know."[36] These numbers make it clear that the establishment of a national level government was not a priority for Iraqis and was the wrong focus of effort for the U.S.

Another poll conducted in May 2004 by a separate organization, the Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies (ICRSS), found similar results. It showed that 51% of Iraqis polled rated their overall quality of services and facilities as "poor" or "very poor."[37] In reference to governance, it found 58% of Iraqis polled responded either "no" or "I don't know" when asked, "If there is a local council in your community are you aware of its activities?" In this same poll, 75% of Iraqis polled did not know the name of their local governor or mayor.[38] This ICRSS poll further demonstrates that Iraqis were not happy with essential services and that governance was not the priority issue for them (see Appendix B for polling data).

The conclusion drawn from the accumulation of these two polls is that security was the biggest concern for Iraqis. Next, the economy and essential services remained close as the number two and three priorities. Finally, the data shows that the establishment of a sovereign, national, democratic government was not a priority for the vast majority of Iraqis and that many Iraqis did not even pay attention to governance.

The data indicate that the U.S. missed an opportunity to capitalize on local governance in lieu of pursuing national level governance. Local level governance would have given the local community a unified voice to push their concerns and priorities forward, which would have assisted them in meeting their physiological needs. This would have taken Iraq down a new road of decentralization and empowered the local officials to find ways to improve their own quality of life instead of relying on the central government. Muqtadr al-Sadr understood this and exploited this power vacuum. His Sadrist agenda provided the necessary public services to the poor Shi'a and, as a result, his organization developed a strong support base, which only complicated an already convoluted political landscape.[39]

WERE IRAQIS' SAFETY NEEDS MET?

The Iraqis' safety needs were not met as evidenced by the scores of insurgent attacks, such as the car bombing in Najaf that killed over 120 people or the attacks on Shi'a shrines in Baghdad and Karbala that killed over 140 people.[40] Further, a U.S. assessment found that the Iraqi Police "were corrupt, unprofessional, and untrustworthy. In fact, they were little more than traffic cops, were despised by the population, and were without investigative competence."[41]

The sectarian strife between Sunni and Shi'a was the main catalyst behind the violence. Malsow's theory suggests that overcoming prejudice requires the most basic needs to be met first, physiology and safety.[42] Leading into the invasion, the Shi'a were struggling to meet their physiological and safety needs. As a result, they entered the occupation period focused on meeting their own needs and distrustful of others, especially the previously empowered Sunnis.

The sectarian gap continued to grow as the Iraqi government was being formed. Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish politicians were competing for autonomy, power, and resources. A number of political issues contributed to the widening sectarian gap, including debate over the drafting of the constitution, Shi'a advocation for autonomy in the south, and the Shi'a perception that the U.S. government began showing favoritism to the Sunnis after withdrawing from the constitution negotiations.[43] The resentment felt between the historically oppressed Shi'a and the now marginalized Sunnis was the spark that triggered the sectarian violence in Iraq.

The Sunnis' ideological tolerance of the Shi'a began to diminish after the invasion as the rise of Wahhabism, an intolerant form of Islam, began to spread in Sunni communities. Wahhabism played to the concerns of the Sunnis as they lamented over their new position in life. Sunnis were inundated with anti-Shi'a literature from Wahhabi schools in Saudi Arabia and lectures in the chief Sunni mosques.[44] This rise of Wahhabism contributed to the prejudice felt toward the Shi'a and rise in sectarian tensions in Iraq.

The insurgency that developed in the Sunni tribes of Western Iraq stemmed from more than just cultural insensitivity on the part of Coalition forces. Like the Sunni middle class, these tribes lost significant stature and income with the fall of the Ba'ath regime. The western tribes were a source of many men for Saddam's elite forces and officer corps and these tribes were duly compensated with government funding and services. Many of these trained and recently

unemployed military men returned home to rejoin their tribes, which laid the groundwork for the insurgency.[45]

The sectarian divide was made evident in the previously integrated streets of Baghdad. Sunni and Shi'a militants drove out their neighbors until the east bank of the Tigris River was predominantly Shi'a and the west bank was predominantly Sunni.[46] The United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq reported that over 700,000 Iraqis were forced to leave their homes between March 2006 and March 2007. The Iraqi Red Crescent Organizations reported that 1,128,000 Iraqis had been displaced by July 2007.[47]

The sectarian divide led to the destabilization of Iraq and the surge in violence. After news of the mass gravesites broke, reports of several hundred politically motivated killings began to surface by May 2003. The victims were mostly members of the Ba'ath Party or security forces under the previous regime. Furthermore, the violence directed at the UN headquarters in August and September of 2003 resulted in Kofi Annan pulling out the majority of the UN staff, leaving only a minimal presence.[48]

The security situation worsened as the U.S. and Coalition partners began to reestablish the Iraqi Security Forces. To speed along the process, former Iraqi police officers were brought back into service, however, they were unqualified, lazy, and treated the population with brutality.[49] This was a carry-over from the previous regime's tendency to utilize the corrupt police force as a means to stifle the population instead of enforcing the law.[50] As security forces were reestablished, they frequently fell under the influence of the prevalent political parties and were utilized to do their bidding. For example, the Basra security forces were under the influence of Shi'a political organizations, such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Sadrist. These police forces were responsible for a significant number of killings

and assignations while in uniform. The police and militia were also suspected of gang related criminal activity and oil smuggling, which negatively affected the Basra community and economy.[51]

The ongoing violence in Iraq was detrimental to the process of establishing a democracy. In February 2004, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy, reported to the UN Security Council that the violence in Iraq would impede elections. His suspicion came true as the Sunni insurgents' threats of violence forced many Sunnis to boycott the elections in January 2005 and, again, as al Qaeda attacked Sunni politicians supporting the December 2005 elections. Many members of the Iraqi Islamic Party were killed, along with members of other political parties.[52]

Planning for and resolving the internal conflicts of a nation is an unreasonable expectation for military planners; however, development of a successful plan to provide security is reasonable. This can be achieved if future planners have an understanding of the underlying issues affecting the stability of a nation. By providing a struggling nation with security, to include training of the indigenous security forces, the U.S. and future partners can give that nation the time and space necessary to peacefully resolve their internal disputes.

WHAT CHALLENGES DID THE U.S. FACE?

The CPA issued two key orders that hindered reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts. They were CPA Order 1 – "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society" and CPA Order 2 – "Dissolution of Entities." These orders will be viewed through Maslow's hierarchy of needs to demonstrate why they were not appropriate given the circumstances in Iraq.

Paul Bremer, as head of the CPA from May 2003 to June 2004, issued CPA Order 1 – "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society" on May 16, 2003.[53] CPA Order 1 removed the Ba'ath Party's Senior Members, designated as the party's top four ranks, from "their positions and banned [them] from future employment in the public sector."[54] Further, anyone found to be "full members" of the Ba'ath Party and holding a position in the top three management levels of any government institution, to include universities and hospitals, were also removed. [55]

According to Bremer, he realized the potential impact de-Ba'athification could have on the Iraqi society. He recognized that there were members who joined purely for employment and he believed there was flexibility in the order to allow for "exceptions...on a case-by-case basis."[56] He and his staff also recognized that de-Ba'athification would eviscerate many of the ministries of their experienced management and set back efforts to re-establish governance.[57] As a result of the order, senior Ba'athists immediately stopped coming to work at the Health Ministry leaving eight of the top twelve positions vacant.[58] In this instance, there was little to be gained by vacating jobs that were necessary to provide for the most basic needs of the Iraqis. It can be argued that some ministries could have been run apolitically with proper oversight, such as the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Electricity; however, this argument is beyond the scope of this paper.

In November 2003, the de-Ba'athification process was turned over to the Iraqi Governing Council, which was largely made up of Iraqi expatriates. This action only made matters worse as the majority of the Governing Council extended the breadth of de-Ba'athification. Attesting to the problems this caused, Bremer wrote, "We had reports from our provincial offices and military commanders that many more people were being subjected to de-Baathification than

foreseen in my initial order."[59] The extensive de-Ba'athification had a devastating effect and was a catalyst for Iraq's insurgency.

De-Ba'athification had a significant effect on teachers. They were used by the Ba'ath regime to push the Ba'ath ideology and if they did not they were dismissed from their jobs. After the fall of the Ba'ath regime, the previously dismissed teachers returned to work as those who had supported the regime were dismissed. Not surprisingly, this was a source of contention for the newly dismissed teachers. For many Sunnis, Bremer's policy was viewed as "de-Sunnification."[60] This left a significant number of Sunnis without work, disgruntled with the sudden usurpation of their station in life, and looking for a way to put their skills to use.

CPA Order 2 – "The Dissolution of Entities" was issued on May 23, 2003 and abolished the Iraqi Army, Ministry of Defense, and the intelligence agencies.[61] Bremer wrote that this was a necessary step to "destroy the underpinnings of the Saddam regime, to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that we have done so and that neither Saddam nor his gang is coming back."[62] Shi'a and Kurdish leaders eager to gain a stronger foothold in the new political landscape of Iraq supported his decision. Bremer recounted a comment he made to General John Abizaid, who disagreed with this policy, "All my conversations with Shia and Kurdish leaders since arriving convince me that bringing back Saddam's army would have set off a civil war here."[63] History would prove that this decision contributed significantly to the development of the insurgency.

CPA Order 2 also provided additional guidance to the de-Ba'athification order. It stated that all members of the security forces with the equivalent rank of colonel or above were considered a senior Ba'ath member and did not qualify for a pension.[64] U.S. officials later learned that only 8,000 of the 140,000 officers and noncommissioned officers in the army were considered committed Ba'athist and that only half of the major generals and a small percentage

of the brigadier generals qualified as committed Ba'athist. Unfortunately, CPA Order 2 prematurely disqualified these very qualified generals from the new Iraqi Army.[65] These hasty actions left a disenfranchised and savvy militarily contingent ready to support the insurgency. Additionally, this order took away the Iraqi Army, the most important symbol of national unity, when Iraq was already suffering from ethnic and sectarian divides.[66]

CPA Orders 1 and 2 unemployed over a half-million people in a country that was already suffering from a 30-50% unemployment rate nation wide. Looking through Maslow's lens, this affected the physiological, safety, and esteem needs of over a half-million Iraqis. Perhaps if the CPA had viewed these problems through Maslow's lens then it would have led to a different decision, such as less extensive de-Ba'athification and maintaining the military. Instead, the decision process for de-Ba'athification was based on the World War II model of de-Nazification;[67] however, Iraq in 2003 was not Germany after World War II. These two orders dismissed and disgruntled a pool of capable people ready for recruitment into the insurgency.

THE HUK REBELLION

The following summary is provided as a case study of a successful counterinsurgency operation viewed through Maslow's lens. The Hukbo ng Bayan Laban so Hapon, or Huk, was a guerilla group established by the Philippine Communist Party to resist the Japanese invasion during World War II. Their communist backing and refusal to work with the U.S. guerilla organization put them out of favor with the U.S. government and the exiled Philippine government. The guerilla groups were disbanded after the Japanese were defeated, however the Huk fighters were not allowed to join the Philippine Military Police Corps or receive the benefits

that the other Philippine veterans did. This embitterment combined with a corrupt Philippine government led the Huks to band together again. Further, the Philippine soldiers and policemen helped the Huks gain more support by frequently exploiting the local population for money and food.[68]

From 1946 until 1950, the Philippine government was completely inept in combating the Huks. The military and police forces lacked initiative to patrol and gather intelligence. They frequently persecuted the populace by making false arrests and burning homes, which only drove the people to further support the insurgency. The Huks provided the people with security and promised land reformation. The Huks, principally the communist organizers behind them, did not realize that land reform was not important to the people. All the people truly wanted was a larger share of the crops they harvested and a sense of security,[69] in essence the foundation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. They were not compelled by Communist ideology, which Ramon Magsaysay understood.[70]

Magsaysay was an inspirational political leader, who with significant support from the U.S. government became the Secretary of National Defense in September 1950. Magsaysay was most likely not familiar with Maslow's work, however he understood the basic needs of the people and he made addressing them a priority. He first reformed the military and police by firing incompetent, corrupt, or lazy officers, but the most significant thing he did was address his own men's basic needs. He ensured they had food to eat and he raised their pay. These reforms removed the soldiers and policemen's motivation to steal from the people and in turn allowed them to gain the trust and support of the population. As a second order effect, this addressed one of the populace's basic needs, security.[71]

After addressing the physiological needs of his military and police, Magsaysay focused on addressing the physiological needs of the common people. He put programs in place that supported agricultural growth by providing farm credit and building roads and irrigation. He also installed health care programs. His biggest success was the Economic Development Corps. This program gave publicly owned lands and the necessary farm tools to insurgents so that they could start their own farms. The government also assisted with building homes, hospitals, and schools on these sites. With their basic needs met, many insurgents and supporters changed their allegiance to the Philippine government.[72]

Maslow's lens also provides an effective way to determine the enemy's critical vulnerability. With the Philippine military's more aggressive COIN strategy, the remaining Huks were deprived of their basic needs. They no longer had a secure base from which to operate or the support of the local populace for food. Lacking food and shelter, most of the remaining insurgents surrendered the cause realizing that a communist ideology is of no use when they are starving and do not have a safe place to rest.[73]

CONCLUSION

This review of OIF and the Huk Rebellion through Maslow's lens has provided five enduring lessons that can be carried forward to future counterinsurgency and reconstruction operations. First, military planners must know the history of the country in order to effectively plan for reconstruction or counterinsurgency operations. A country repressed from autocratic rule or struggling with sectarian strife will be hard to persuade that a democratic government is the answer to their problems. The examination of Iraq's history showed that the majority of Iraqis did not have experience with democracy; thus it was an unrealistic expectation that waving

the banner of democracy would instill hope in Iraqis. What will be effective in future operations is making tangible changes in living conditions and providing security in order to provide the indigenous leaders with the time and space necessary to resolve difficult problems and establish a strong foundation for a successful government.

Second, it is critical to understand the population's needs. During OIF the CPA did not adjust course after realizing the extent of the devastation, instead it pressed toward establishing a sovereign national government. Yes, Iraq is now a sovereign country, but was the cost unnecessarily high? In the Huk Rebellion, Magsaysay addressed the population's needs by giving them a means to earn a living and providing them with security. Had governance really been the people's concern then the Huk's Communist ideology would have motivated the people to push for a regime change, even though their principle concerns had been addressed by the government.

Third, military planners need to take into consideration the second and third order effects of their decisions. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a useful tool in determining these consequences. For instance, CPA Orders 1 and 2 dismissed one and half million people from their jobs in an already devastated economy, which affected the physiological needs of these individuals and their families. On the other hand, Magsaysay took advantage of the second order effects by providing food and better pay to his security forces, thus they were no longer motivated by their physiological needs to steal from the local populace. As a result, he addressed the population's safety needs.

Fourth, establishing local governance is more beneficial both for addressing the needs of the people and as a starting point towards establishing national governance. As the polling data indicated, 58% of Iraqis polled in May 2004, a year after the invasion, did not know what their

local council was doing for them.[74] This was a missed opportunity to show Iraqis that they have a voice and that taking local action would allow them to take control of their lives. Further, establishing local governance allows a new crop of politicians to gain experience, credibility, and support to later be elected to a regional government and then a national government. Iraq may have been better served had the CPA developed and propagandized a phased plan to turn over governance to the Iraqis incrementally. The first phase would have focused on repairing essential services, training security forces, and establishing local governance. The second phase would have focused on establishing regional governance and drafting a constitution. The final phase would have focused on establishing national governance. This process would have required a longer view and patience by both Iraqis and Americans; however, less violence and meeting the basic needs of the people may have helped facilitate both.

Finally, Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a useful lens through which to view the problem of reconstruction and counterinsurgency. It is not the answer to future counterinsurgency or reconstruction operations, but it does provide a means to frame the problem. Future planners can use Maslow's lens to assess the condition of a failed state and then prioritize the issues. This method is applicable in both Phase 0 operations to prevent an insurgency and in Phase IV operations to establish stability after a war. To over simplify the thesis, starving people will be happier with a bowl of rice than a voting booth.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

It is important to discuss the limitations of Maslow's hierarchy of needs in problem framing and the research provided in this paper. First, Maslow's theory is based on western

cultural norms and does not account for cultural differences, such as tribal culture.[75] Meeting the physiological and safety needs of a population is a good starting place for any COIN or reconstruction operation, however the implication of cultural differences in the higher order needs will require further research. Second, Maslow's hierarchy puts physiological needs before safety needs, thus it does not account for the necessity of establishing a secure environment before providing for the more basic physiological needs. Third, additional research into other COIN and reconstruction campaigns, such as Vietnam or Algeria, would be useful to either validate or disprove this thesis. Finally, this research does not address the following questions: (1) Is Maslow's lens still useful in COIN or reconstruction operations where the physiological and security needs are already met? Perhaps a study of the American Revolution in this context would be appropriate. (2) Should the love and esteem needs even be considered in COIN planning? These questions can only be addressed through examination of other COIN and reconstruction operations.

Endnotes

[1] Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 1987), 56-57.
[2] See *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (Gordon and Trainor), *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Ricks), and *Imperial Life in the Emerald City* (Chandrasekaran).
[3] Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 43-44.
[4] Dawisha, 41, 44.
[5] Dawisha, 48-51, 57, 59.
[6] Dawisha, 60-62.
[7] Dawisha, 69.
[8] Dawisha, 87.
[9] Dawisha, 67-69, 87, 90-91.
[10] Dawisha, 92, 112-113, 135, 171-172, 183, 193-194.
[11] U.S. Agency for International Development, *A Year in Iraq* (Washington, DC: Agency for International Development, May 2004), 14, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/ayeariniraq.html (accessed October 26, 2009).
[12] Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) 114.
[13] Allawi, 114.
[14] USAID, 18,20.
[15] Allawi, 130.
[16] Allawi, 121.

[17] USAID, 18.
[18] Allawi, 122, 130.
[19] Allawi, 123, 127, 128.
[20] Allawi, 129.
[21] USAID, 14.
[22] Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 472.
[23] Allawi, 129.
[24] USAID, 6.
[25] USAID, 6.
[26] Cobra II, 467-468.
[27] Manolis Priniotakis, ed., *Countering Insurgency and Promoting Democracy* (New York: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2008), 71.
[28] Cobra II, 465, 466.
[29] USAID, 16.
[30] Allawi, 128.
[31] Allawi, 383.
[32] USAID, 21.
[33] Maslow, 56-57.
[34] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006) 213.
[35] Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, *Public Opinion in Iraq: First Poll Following Abu Ghraib Revelations* (Baghdad, Iraq: IIACSS, June 2004), slides 3, 25, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/06iiacss.pdf (accessed January 7, 2009).
[36] IIACSS, slide 3, 16
[37] Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, *Public Opinion Survey in Iraq: Civil Society Survey – Nationwide* (Baghdad, Iraq: ICRSS, May 2004), 8, http://www.irqcrss.org/pdf/30.pdf (accessed January 7, 2009).
[38] ICRSS, slide 5.
[39] Allawi, 167, 248.
[40] Hussein D. Hassan, *Iraq: Milestones Since the Ouster of Saddam Hussein*, CRS Report for Congress RS22598 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 19, 2007), 4, 5.
[41] Cobra II, 465,466.
[42] Maslow, 56-57.
[43] Allawi, 72, 448.
[44] Allawi, 234-236.
[45] Allawi, 244.
[46] Allawi, 447.
[47] Dawisha, 263, 264.
[48] Allawi, 144, 145, 171, 400.
[49] Michael Moss, "Law and Disorder: How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War," *New York Times*, May 22, 2006.
[50] Moss.
[51] Allawi, 422.
[52] Allawi, 226-228, 441.
[53] Allawi, 150.
[54] L. Paul Bremer and Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 41.
[55] Bremer, 41.
[56] Bremer, 41-42.
[57] Bremer, 41-42.
[58] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 71.
[59] Bremer, 260-261.
[60] Allawi, 151, 152, 383.
[61] Cobra II, 483.
[62] Bremer, 57.

[63] Bremmer, 224.
[64] Fiasco, 162, 163.
[65] Cobra II, 485.
[66] Fiasco, 162.
[67] Chandrasekaran, 69.
[68] Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 91-93.
[69] Moyar, 93-96.
[70] Moyar, 93-96.
[71] Moyar, 99-101.
[72] Moyar, 103.
[73] Moyar, 104.
[74] ICRSS, slide 5.
[75] Major Jonathan P. Dunne, "Cultures Are Different: Modifying Maslow's Hierarchy for Contemporary COIN," *Marine Corps Gazette* 93, no. 2 (February 2009): 12.

CHRONOLOGY

1534 – 1918	The area that would become Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire.
1920	United Kingdom awarded the Mandate for Iraq by the League of Nations.
1921	King Faysal establishes the Hashemite monarchy.
3 October 1932	Iraq becomes a sovereign nation.
14 July 1958	General Qasim Coup
08 February 1963	Ba'ath Party Coup
17 January 1991	Operation Desert Storm begins.
24 February 1991	Ground operations in Operation Desert Storm begin.
03 March 1991	Operation Desert Storm cease-fire
08 April 1991	Northern No-Fly Zone is established to protect Kurds.
26 August 1992	Southern No-Fly Zone is established to protect Shi'a.
19 March 2003	Coalition forces begin striking Iraqi military targets
09 April 2003	U.S. forces advance into central Baghdad.
21 April 2003	Lt. General Jay Garner (ret) arrives in Baghdad to oversee reconstruction efforts.
01 May 2003	President Bush announces major combat operations in Iraq have ended.
11 May 2003	Paul Bremer succeeds Jay Garner as chief U.S. administrator in Iraq.
16 May 2003	CPA Order Number 1 – "De-Ba'athification" is issued.
23 May 2003	CPA Order Number 2 – "Dissolution of Entities" is issued.
13 July 2003	U.S. appointed 25-seat Iraqi Governing Council meets for the first time.
07 August 2003	Jordanian embassy in Baghdad is car bombed killing at least 14 people and wounding dozens more.
19 August 2003	U.N. headquarters in Baghdad is car bombed killing 20, including U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello.

29 August 2003	The leader of SCIRI, Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim, and over 120 more people are killed in Najaf by a car bomb.
15 November 2003	The U.S. and Iraqi Governing Council decide to move the up the transition to sovereignty to 30 June, 2004.
13 December 2003	Saddam Hussein is captured by U.S. forces.
02 March 2004	Insurgent attacks on Shi'a shrines in Baghdad and Karbala kill over 143 people.
30 April 2004	U.S. media reports the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal.
08 June 2004	U.N. Resolution 1546 declares the end of the occupation of Iraq and endorses the interim government as fully sovereign.
28 June 2004	U.S. gives sovereignty of Iraq to the Interim Government led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

Note: Chronology was compiled from CRS Report for Congress RS22598, *Iraq: Milestones Since the Ouster of Saddam Hussein*, *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation* and www.globalsecurity.org *(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/timeline.htm).*

APPENDIX A: MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS DIAGRAM



http://theskooloflife.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/maslows-hierarchy.gif

APPENDIX B: POLLING DATA



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APPENDIX B: POLLING DATA



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Don't Know = 375

None = 218

Total Respondents = 1093

375 + 218 = 593/1093 = 0.54 x 100% = 54%

* Authors deductions from the presented information.

APPENDIX B: POLLING DATA



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Note: This poll was conducted in August 2007 and provides the Iraqi opinion of security, governance, and other issues. The report does not provide the sampling location of the survey or the sample size. It was commissioned by ABC News, the BBC, and NHK (a Japanese news broadcaster).

D3 Systems. *Iraq Poll March 2008.* Vienna, VA: D3 Systems, September 2007. http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/09bbciraqipoll.pdf (accessed January 2009).
Note: This poll was conducted in February 2008 and provides the Iraqi opinion of security, governance, and other issues. The report does not provide the sampling location of the survey. The sample size was 2,228 Iraqis. It was commissioned by ABC News, the BBC, ARD (a German news broadcaster) and NHK (a Japanese news broadcaster).

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Note: This public opinion poll was conducted in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Diwaniyah, Hillah and Baqubah in May 2004. The sample size was 1,093 Iraqis. This poll shows Iraqi opinions and concerns in reference to security, governance, economy and infrastructure.

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Note: This book proved very useful for research by providing an Iraqi perspective. It was useful in providing information on the challenges of the post-Saddam and post-invasion Iraq. It also thoroughly documented the events and challenges in establishing an Iraqi government after the invasion through 2005.

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Note: This book was used to gain the perspective of a leading U.S. official in Iraq, especially in reference to the decisions on De-Ba'athification and Dissolution of Entities. Bremer puts a positive spin on his time in Iraq and the decisions he made while in charge of the CPA.

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Note: This book provided a history of governance in Iraq since inception during the British Mandate through the occupation. It provided insight into ethnocentric divides that are inherent in Iraq.

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Note: This article was useful to frame the limitations in applying Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

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Note: This book provided insight into how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare and when to establish a local and then regional government. This is must read for anyone involved in counterinsurgency. The lessons are timeless.

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Note: This article discusses Iraqi Police Forces tied to militias and targeting Sunnis, especially in Baghdad.

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Note: This article provided good insight into the corruption and sectarian violence manifested in the Iraqi Police.

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Note: This collection of articles provided insight into the condition of Iraq leading into the invasion and lessons learned for establishing democratic government in a previously oppressed society.

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Note: This book was used to provide summary of the Huk Rebellion and contrast it to Iraq.

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Note: This article provided an example of corruption in the Iraqi Government, specifically in the Ministry of Defense.